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ABSTRACT  
Most forecasts by citizens as to which party will win a given election are correct, 
and such forecasts usually have a higher level of accuracy than voter intention 
polls. How do they do it? We argue that social networks are a big part of the 
answer: much of what we know as citizens comes from our interactions with 
others. Previous research has considered only indirect characteristics of social 
networks when analyzing why citizens are good forecasters. We use a unique 
German survey and consider direct measures of social networks in order to 
explore their role in election forecasting. We find that three network 
characteristics – size, political composition, and frequency of political 
discussion – are among the most important variables when predicting the 
accuracy of citizens’ election forecasts.  
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Social Networks and Citizen Election Forecasting:  
The More Friends the Better 
 
 
1. Introduction 
In most elections, the majority of citizens are able to predict the election winner 
correctly, regardless of who they plan to vote for (Lewis-Beck & Skalaban, 
1989; Lewis-Beck & Tien, 1999; Miller, Wang, Kulkarni, Poor, & Osherson, 
2012; Murr, 2011, 2015, 2016).  Most US citizens typically predict correctly not 
only which presidential candidate will win their state, but also who will win the 
presidency (e.g., Graefe, 2014); and most British citizens are usually correct 
about both which party will win their constituency and which will garner a 
parliamentary majority (e.g., Lewis-Beck & Stegmaier, 2011; Murr, 2016).  How 
do they do it? 
A small body of work suggests that social networks are a big part of the 
answer. Since much of what we know as citizens comes from our social 
networks (e.g., Huckfeldt & Sprague 1995), we base our election predictions – 
like so many of our beliefs – on information from other people in our network 
(Uhlaner & Grofman, 1986; Lewis-Beck & Tien, 1999; Meffert, Huber, 
Gschwend, & Pappi, 2011).  However, previous studies on social networks and 
citizen forecasting accuracy have been hampered by the lack of direct 
measures of social network characteristics, relying instead on indirect or proxy 
measures. For example, Lewis-Beck and Tien (1999) find that people with 
higher levels of education are better able to predict who will win. This is 
probably because people with higher levels of education are more likely to 
develop skills in acquiring and processing information. They also intimate that 
a person’s level of education tells us something about the size of their network, 
with more educated individuals possessing larger networks. Uhlaner and 
Grofman (1986) and Meffert et al. (2011) use electoral differences between the 
citizen’s electoral district and the national level to capture the network’s partisan 
composition indirectly, because the surveys that they use do not collect 
measures of social network party leanings. However, these indirect measures 
may miss important aspects of the effect of social networks on citizen 
forecasting.   
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This study uses direct measures of citizens’ network sizes and 
compositions, along with other network characteristics, in order to build a more 
complete model of citizen forecasting. Using a unique cross-sectional survey 
that collected both citizen election forecasts and direct measures of several 
social network characteristics in Germany in the autumn of 1990, we 
demonstrate that social networks have as much predictive power of citizen 
forecasting accuracy as the predictors identified as most important by previous 
research, namely vote intention and political interest.  In addition, we show 
which social network characteristics have predictive power for influencing 
election forecasts (size, political composition, and frequency of discussion) and 
which do not (heterogeneity and level of expertise).  In addition, we also provide 
guidance for future surveys as to what network measure to include in order to 
improve the accuracy of citizen election forecasts.  Using a cross-validation 
exercise, we demonstrate that a single, abbreviated measure of the network 
size improves out-of-sample predictions.  
 
2. Why citizen forecasts? 
 
As the field of election forecasting has grown, scholars have experimented with 
many different measures and methods in an attempt to find the most accurate 
predictors (for reviews, see Stegmaier & Norpoth, 2017; Lewis-Beck & 
Stegmaier, 2014). Such models often include vote intentions or government 
approval ratings a few months prior to the election as a gauge of the electorate’s 
preferences.1  Such variables can be found in models of elections in the US 
(Campbell, 2016; Erikson & Wlezien, 2016), Britain (Ford, Jennings, Pickup, & 
Wlezien, 2016; Stegmaier & Williams, 2016) and Germany (Norpoth & 
Gschwend, 2017; Jérôme, Jérôme-Speziari, & Lewis-Beck, 2017), among 
others. Both the approval and vote intention items reflect the respondent’s 
personal assessment of the incumbent government or the candidates.  
However, a developing branch of the election forecasting literature has begun 
to utilize electoral expectations, measured by the question, “who do you think 
                                                 
1 In addition to voting intention polls or approval ratings, such models often include economic 
performance measures, the number of terms the party has held office, and previous election results. 
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will win the election?”  This approach is referred to as “citizen forecasting”, and 
has been used for election prediction in both the US (Lewis-Beck & Skalaban, 
1989; Lewis-Beck & Tien, 1999; Graefe, 2014; Murr, 2015) and Britain (Lewis-
Beck & Stegmaier, 2011; Murr, 2011, 2016). 
 In such citizen forecasting models, the survey responses are aggregated 
to the level of prediction, whether the national level or the constituency level, 
and most often, citizens get it right.  For instance, in their pioneering study, 
Lewis-Beck and Skalaban (1989) looked at citizen forecasts of eight US 
presidential elections between 1956 and 1984.  They found that, on average, 
69% of citizens forecast the election winner correctly, but that the majority of 
citizens forecasted 75% (six out of eight) of the elections correctly.  In other 
words, moving from individual to aggregate forecasts improved the accuracy 
from 69% to 75% – an increase of six percentage points.  Their two main 
findings – that most citizens forecast correctly most of the time, and that groups 
forecast better than individuals – have subsequently been replicated at two 
different levels (subnational and national) and in two countries (Britain and 
United States); see for example Graefe (2014), Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier 
(2011) and Murr (2011, 2015, 2016). 
 In addition to demonstrating that citizen forecasts are accurate, several 
studies have also shown that citizen forecasts are more accurate than any other 
forecasting approach, including voter intention polls. Using national-level data 
from the last 100 days before each of the seven US presidential elections 
between 1988 and 2012, Graefe (2014) compared the relative accuracies of 
citizen forecasts, voter intentions, prediction markets, expert surveys, and 
quantitative models. He found that citizen forecasts are better than any other 
approach at forecasting both election winners and vote shares. Similarly, Murr, 
Stegmaier, and Lewis-Beck (2016) used national-level data from the 48 months 
before each of the 18 British general elections between 1950 and 2015 to 
compare the relative accuracies of citizen forecasts and voter intentions, and 
found that citizen forecasts are better than voter intentions at forecasting both 
the winning party and its seat share. 
As Murr (2015) has shown, the accuracy of citizen forecasts can even 
be increased by weighting and delegating the individual forecasts optimally 
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based on the citizens’ competence (e.g., Grofman, 1975; Kazmann, 1973; 
Shapley & Grofman, 1984).  The method involves two steps: first, predict the 
probability that each citizen will forecast correctly; then, delegate the 
forecasting to the most competent citizen and weight their forecasts according 
to their level of competence.  Using data from eleven US presidential elections 
between 1952 and 2012, Murr (2015) showed that this increases the 
forecasting accuracy of both the candidates’ vote shares in a state and which 
candidate will carry the state.  Thus, being able to predict the chance of a citizen 
forecasting the election correctly is crucial for improving the forecasting 
accuracy. 
 
3. Why can citizens forecast correctly? 
 
The explanation as to why citizen forecasts are accurate has two parts 
(Murr, 2017). The first part explains why groups forecast better than individuals. 
This explanation rests on the assumption that individuals forecast better than 
chance on average, and the second part of the explanation rests on why 
individuals are able to do so. 
 Murr (2011) explains the fact that groups predict better than individuals 
based on Condorcet’s jury theorem and its generalizations (Condorcet, 1785). 
Condorcet demonstrates the conditions under which the group decisions 
reached by a plurality rule are better than, equal to, or worse than individual 
decisions. His proof assumes that (i) the group faces two alternatives, one 
correct and one incorrect, (ii) the k group members vote independently of one 
another, and (iii) each member has one vote and the same probability p of 
choosing the correct alternative.  Then, the probability of a correct group 
decision by a majority vote is 
𝑃 = ∑ (
𝑘
𝑚
)𝑝𝑚(1 − 𝑝)𝑘−𝑚
𝑘
𝑚=⌊𝑘/2⌋+1
. 
He shows that if each member chooses the correct alternative with more than 
a 50% probability, the probability of a correct group decision approaches unity 
as the group size increases to infinity (“wisdom of crowds”). He also shows that 
if each member chooses the correct alternative with less than a 50% probability, 
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the probability of a correct group decision approaches zero as the group size 
increases to infinity (“folly of crowds”). 
Although Condorcet’s jury theorem refers to group sizes approaching 
infinity, even small groups show the effect of aggregating individual choices.  
Consider a group of three independent members, each with an 0.6 probability 
of choosing the correct alternative.  This group chooses the correct alternative 
using a majority vote if at least two of the three members vote correctly. Using 
the above formula, the probability of a correct group decision is 𝑃 = 3 × 0.62 ×
0.4 + 0.63 = 0.648, an increase in accuracy of about five percentage points.  
This probability increases as the group size increases: it is 0.6824 with five 
independent members, 0.7102 with seven members, 0.7334 with nine 
members, and so on.  In other words, even though individually members may 
be only slightly better than chance in getting it right, collectively they may 
choose the correct alternative with almost certainty, if the group has enough 
members. Table 1 displays the probabilities of a correct group decision for 
different individual probabilities of getting it right (p = 0.6, 0.7, 0.8, and 0.9) as 
well as different group sizes (k = 3, 5, 7, and 9). 
 
Table 1. The probability of a correct majority vote from k members with 
an individual probability of getting it right of p. 
 k = 3 k = 5 k = 7 k = 9 
p = 0.6 0.6480 0.6826 0.7102 0.7334 
p = 0.7 0.7840 0.8369 0.8740 0.9012 
p = 0.8 0.8960 0.9421 0.9667 0.9804 
p = 0.9 0.9720 0.9914 0.9973 0.9991 
 
In deriving his theorem, Condorcet made three assumptions: each 
member chooses between only two alternatives, votes independently of the 
others, and has the same probability of voting correctly.  Since the publication 
of his theorem, several other authors have relaxed each of these assumptions 
in turn and generalized the theorem accordingly. The theorem still holds even 
with more than two alternatives (List & Goodin, 2001), which is important 
because many elections involve voters choosing between more than two 
parties.  Further, Ladha (1992) generalizes the theorem to correlated votes.  
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This is important because citizens might share the same information, talk to 
each other, or tend to “groupthink” (e.g., Janis, 1982).  Finally, Grofman, Owen, 
and Feld (1983) prove that the theorem still holds if members differ in their 
probability of getting it right as long as they are all better than chance on 
average.  This is important because Lewis-Beck and Skalaban (1989) show 
that citizens vary in their probability of making a correct forecast.  In summary, 
these generalizations make the theorem useful for explaining why groups of 
citizens predict better than individuals. 
 Since the explanation of why groups predict better than individuals rests 
on the fact that individuals predict better than chance on average, the next step 
is to explain why this is the case. Murr (2017) explains the fact that individuals 
predict better than chance based on Uhlaner and Grofman’s Contact Model 
(Uhlaner & Grofman, 1986). Echoing Condorcet’s jury theorem, the Contact 
Model proves the conditions under which a citizen’s forecast, reached by 
choosing the party that is supported by the plurality of information available to 
the citizen, will be better than, equal to or worse than chance. The proof 
assumes that the citizen is forecasting a two-party election, receives and 
accepts pieces of information from the environment independently of one 
another, and counts each piece of information equally. 
The Contact Model implies that if a citizen receives and accepts only 
information that is consistent with her vote intention (“selective sampling”), 
citizen forecasts will always be better than chance on average, though always 
as informative as voter intentions. However, if a citizen receives and accepts 
information that is representative of the public’s voter intentions (“random 
sampling”), citizens will always be better than both chance and voter intentions 
on average. As the number of randomly sampled bits of information increases 
to infinity, the probability of a correct forecast approaches unity.  In other words, 
citizens will do better than chance and voter intentions, as is indeed the case, 
as soon as they receive and accept at least some information that is 
representative of the public’s vote intention (e.g., Lewis-Beck & Skalaban, 
1989; Graefe, 2014). 
Because much of what we know as citizens comes from interpersonal 
communication, we argue both that citizens’ social networks predict their 
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election forecasts, and that these networks offer the representative information 
that is necessary to enable them to forecast better than chance. 
 
4. Social networks and citizen forecasts 
 
 The study of social networks—the social context through which 
individuals are tied to others—has shed light on both the way and the extent to 
which friends, family, neighbors, and peers influence electoral belief formation 
and voting behavior.  within addition to learning from previous cohorts and 
personal experience (Manski, 2004, Blais & Bodet, 2006) and the media 
(Entman, 1989), networks provide contextual information that both allows 
voters to form expectations about elections and influences their choices.  
Meffert et al. (2011), for example, analyze various factors that influence 
electoral expectations, such as political motivations (knowledge and interest), 
rational and strategic considerations (the perceived distance between parties), 
and social context (regional differences, as a proxy for personal networks), and 
how these expectations influence voting behavior.  The authors find that voters 
can form reasonable expectations about the winning party and that these 
beliefs are used to cast “fairly sophisticated votes”, such as strategic coalition 
voting.   
Complementarily, Pattie and Johnston (1999) showed that 
conversations with partisan discussants influence vote decisions, and can even 
lead citizens to switch their vote to another party.  Similarly, Huckfeldt and 
Sprague (1991) showed that vote preferences are not determined only by voter 
characteristics, but also by their discussant partners’ characteristics and 
political preferences; while Nickerson (2008) provided evidence regarding the 
influence of couples on voting behaviors. Other studies have shown that 
variations in the composition and size of an individual’s network affect their 
political attitudes and the amount of political information they have, which in 
turn affect their behavior and their beliefs (Huckfeldt, 2007; Mutz, 1998; 
Huckfeldt & Mendez, 2008; Partheymüller & Schmitt-Beck, 2012; Pietryka, 
2015).  
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  But how do people form electoral expectations? Citizens may gather 
information and update their beliefs about electoral victories based on: (1) their 
network members’ characteristics, by observing how other members act and 
think about political, social and economic matters; (2) direct information from 
their network, by discussing who they think will win the election and which party 
they support; (3) previous electoral experiences; and (4) the news and opinion 
polls.  
 The very nature of social networks makes this source of information 
more likely to influence citizen electoral expectations and behavior than other 
sources such as the news media or polls. For instance, Schmitt-Beck and 
Mackenrodt (2010) show that personal communication appears to be more 
influential regarding turnout in a German local election than mass 
communication. Despite the fact that the media and polls may provide more 
reliable and balanced information about the electoral environment than social 
networks, information from social networks may provide more personalized 
information by using language and terms that are closer to the local context and 
more familiar.  
While the news media and polls are passive sources of information, 
social networks give citizens the chance to actively disagree with dissonant 
information and to learn from it by debating with network members. Hence, 
though all sources of information may be complementary, social networks 
provide citizens with the opportunity to engage in back-and-forth debate and to 
learn from disagreements. As was suggested by McClurg (2006), social 
networks can encourage higher levels of political involvement, as well as an 
increased openness to differing viewpoints.  In other words, people can learn 
from their networks. 
The magnitude of a network’s influence on citizens’ beliefs about who 
will win the election may depend on the network’s size, frequency of political 
discussion, political expertise and composition (heterogeneity), along with 
additional sources of political information.2 Citizens who are embedded in larger 
social networks may have an advantage in forecasting elections, as they 
                                                 
2 Similarly, Millner and Ollivier (2016) discuss three main factors that determine the public’s beliefs in 
the context of environmental policies: individual inference (how the updating of beliefs takes place), 
social learning and media. 
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frequently have higher levels of political knowledge (Kwak, Williams, Wang, & 
Lee, 2005). In addition, the larger the social network, the more likely it is to 
reflect the vote intentions of the population, making the aforementioned indirect 
inference more accurate (Banerjee & Fudenberg, 2004).3  
Citizens without a network (isolated citizens) are likely to form their 
beliefs about who will win the election based on media or poll information, as 
well as on their own electoral preferences. However, if these citizens are 
incorrect in their belief of who will win the election, they lack the social 
contextual pressure or ability to update their expectations. In contrast, citizens 
with initially wrong or uncertain beliefs who are embedded in networks may 
retrieve information from their network in order to revise their expectations 
using information about their network’s voting preferences (Chandra, 2009).    
Having large networks may influence beliefs and behavior, but the 
information that citizens obtain from them should be updated frequently. The 
more political discussions that citizens have with their network, the more 
information they collect from its members and the more they will be able to 
remember it. Additional information may also render the network’s information 
more salient than the citizen’s own information when it provides the citizen with 
new information. Moreover, the increased frequency of discussion encourages 
citizens to become more informed, thus improving their ability to forecast 
(Eveland, 2004; Eveland & Hively, 2009). 
 Both informed and uninformed citizens use networks to gather 
information about the political system and elections (Pietryka, 2015).  They 
seek out political experts to help them evaluate an election, even if they do not 
share the same partisan affiliation. Citizens are more likely to be influenced by 
those who they perceive as having expertise (Huckfeldt & Mendez, 2008; Ryan, 
2011; Ahn, Huckfeldt, & Ryan, 2014; Huckfeldt, Pietryka, & Reilly, 2014) than 
by non-experts.  Thus, these experts within the network should help improve 
citizens’ forecasting accuracy by providing accurate, if still biased, information. 
Political expertise can also help in recognizing dissonant information and 
rejecting it (McClurg 2006). 
                                                 
3 This is true only if the most important agent’s influence diminishes as the number of network 
members increases (Golub & Jackson, 2010). 
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In general, social networks play a role in both the dissemination of 
information and the acquisition of information that reduces ambiguity (Manski 
2004; Ahn et al., 2014; Eveland & Hively, 2009; Finkel & Smith, 2011).  
However, in some cases, the information acquired from social networks may 
actually decrease the likelihood of a correct election prediction.  When a political 
network leans toward the losing parties, or a citizen is unsure of how other 
network members will vote, this will undermine the citizen’s ability to offer an 
accurate election prediction. Those embedded in homogeneous networks may 
assume that there is a greater support for a political party than in fact exists, 
and such networks may also reinforce “wishful thinking”; thus, citizens 
belonging to these networks may overestimate the chances of victory of a party 
that actually has little chance of success.   
   While political disagreement in networks persists even in multiparty 
electorates (Huckfeldt, Ikeda, & Pappi, 2005; Huckfeldt & Johnson, 2004), 
individuals frequently find themselves in social networks with other like-minded 
individuals. The homogeneity (homophily) of the network may either increase 
or decrease the likelihood of a successful forecast.  Individuals in 
heterogeneous networks tend to show higher levels of political knowledge, as 
they frequently seek out additional information when they interact with those 
who do not share their views, which should improve their electoral forecasts 
(Eveland & Hively 2009).  However, to the extent that individuals rely on their 
networks to act as representative samples, more homogenous networks, 
particularly those which are allied with an unlikely winner, will decrease the 
likelihood of a correct forecast.  Thus, in such cases, the inclusion of more 
people in a person’s network will not add new information. As such, social 
networks may improve citizens’ ability to make accurate electoral forecasts, but 
this depends on the size and composition of the networks. 
 
5. Data and measures 
 
The 1990 German federal election offers a unique electoral context in 
which to examine how social networks predict citizens’ ability to forecast the 
election, as it provides a direct comparison between citizens with long-term 
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democratic experience (West Germans) and citizens who were new to 
democratic elections (East Germans), without varying the institutional or 
electoral context.  West Germany held its first democratic election on 14 August 
1949, whereas East Germany did not hold its first democratic election until 18 
March 1990.  The December 2, 1990, Bundestag federal election was the first 
Federal Republic of Germany election for East Germans, who had voted only 
four months earlier to unify with West Germany. 
The governing Christian Democratic Union (CDU) had been losing 
support ever since its electoral victory in January 1987 (Figure 1). This loss 
benefited the main opposition party, the Social Democratic Party (SPD), which 
then led the polls from October 1987 to September 1989.  However, the CDU 
started to recover midway through the electoral cycle, and led again for the first 
time in October 1989, beginning a period of uncertainty about whether the CDU 
or the SPD would win the subsequent election. From March 1990 onward, it 
looked increasingly likely that the CDU would be victorious in December. They 
won the East German general election in March, leading the SPD by 19 
percentage points.  In April, Oskar Lafontaine, the SPD candidate, fell victim to 
an assassination attempt and was unable to campaign for three months.  From 
August onwards, opinion polls showed the CDU to be in the lead, due largely 
to the public perception that the CDU was the party best able to handle the 
economic consequences of unification (Pulzer, 1991). However, even though 
the outcome was fairly certain, as we discuss in the next section, not everyone 
correctly forecast a CDU win. 
 
Figure 1: Voting intentions, 1987–1990. 
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Source: Forschungsgruppe Wahlen (2017). 
 
We examine how social networks predict the ability of citizens to forecast 
by using the 1990 German section of the Comparative National Elections 
Project, a cross-national survey that collects both traditional individual-level 
data and information on the respondents’ media, organizational, and (most 
importantly for this project) social network characteristics (Gunther, Beck, 
Magalhães, & Moreno, 2015; Gunther, Puhle, & Montero, 2007). The German 
section of this survey relies on face-to-face interviews in the pre-election period 
(October and November 1990), and includes a network battery that asked 
respondents to name up to five people with whom they discuss important 
matters.  Our sample includes a total of 1547 respondents, of whom 487 are 
from East Germany.  This survey uniquely (to the best of our knowledge) 
provides both information on the character and extensiveness of a respondent’s 
social networks and the respondent’s electoral forecast.         
 To measure the ability of citizens to forecast the winner of the election 
correctly, we rely on a survey item that asks respondents whether they believe 
that a CDU-led or an SPD-led government is likely to win the election, or they 
do not know.4  Based on the previous literature, we code all respondents who 
predict a CDU victory as correct forecasters, and all other respondents as 
                                                 
4 The question wordings can be found in the appendix. 
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incorrect. The majority of respondents forecast the winner correctly; however, 
approximately 25% of West Germans and 18% of East Germans made 
incorrect forecasts about the election. It is notable here that the East Germans 
were better forecasters than the West Germans, despite their limited 
experience with democratic elections. 
We differentiate between uncertain and inaccurate answers by creating 
a categorical variable, where those who answer SPD are treated as inaccurate, 
those who respond with ‘don’t know’ are uncertain, and correct CDU forecasts 
are treated as the reference category. While the proportions of inaccurate 
forecasts are similar between East and West Germans, with 9.9% and 9.5% 
respectively forecasting an SPD victory, more than 15.7% of West Germans 
were uncertain about the election outcome, compared to only 8.9% of East 
Germans.   
 We test how social networks predict the accuracy of election forecasts 
by examining four network characteristics: network size, frequency of political 
discussion in the network, political expertise in the network, and network 
ideology (heterogeneity).  The network size ranges from 1 to 5,5 and is based 
on the number of discussants that the respondent named in the network 
battery.6  The frequency of political discussion measures how often, on 
average, the respondent discusses political matters with members of their 
network, based on the respondent evaluation, ranging from always to never 
(network discussion).  Network expertise is based on the average evaluation of 
each network member’s level of political knowledge. Network ideology is 
measured as both the proportion of the network that the respondent believes 
will vote for a left-leaning party (network left), and the proportion of the network 
for whom the respondent does not know the political party preference (network 
                                                 
5 We exclude respondents without a discussant because the other network characteristics cannot be 
calculated for them.  
6 Since the creation of this survey in 1990, there has been a growingly scholarly discussion about 
network size generators.  Although Mardsen (2003) demonstrates that less than 10% of respondents 
generate more than five names, and Merluzzi and Bert (2013) provide evidence suggesting that five is a 
cost-effective number of network responses, Eveland, Hutchens, and Morey (2013) argue that the type 
of name generator used in this survey consistently underestimates the network size.  However, given 
our theoretical expectation, we argue that this underestimation provides a conservative test for our 
hypotheses. In addition, summary network measures cannot measure network characteristics other than 
the size (Eveland et al., 2013). 
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unknown).7 Finally, network heterogeneity is operationalized as one minus the 
absolute difference between the proportions of left- and right-leaning members 
in the respondent’s network.8 While increases in the network size, frequency of 
discussion, network expertise, and network heterogeneity may be expected to 
improve the ability of the respondent to forecast the outcome of the election 
correctly, the network ideology, particularly for left-leaning networks, may 
decrease the likelihood of a correct election forecast, as was suggested in the 
previous section. Table 2 displays summary statistics of the network variables. 
 
Table 2: Summary statistics of network variables.   
 
West Germans  East Germans 
 
Average SD Min Max  Average SD Min Max 
Network size 2.46 1.21 1 5  2.67 1.24 1 5 
Network discussion  1.64 0.80 0 3  2.39 0.63 0 3 
Network expertise 1.08 0.54 0 2  1.27 0.50 0 2 
Network left (proportion) 0.31 0.40 0 1  0.27 0.37 0 1 
Network unknown (proportion) 0.29 0.41 0 1  0.28 0.40 0 1 
Network heterogeneity 0.42 0.43 0 1  0.43 0.43 0 1 
 
 In addition to these network effects, we also consider other factors that 
previous studies have suggested might predict the accuracy of the forecasts 
(e.g., Lewis-Beck & Tien, 1999; Meffert et al., 2011): political, media, and 
demographic factors, as well as the number of days before the election that the 
survey interview took place. We capture individual partisanship and the effects 
of ‘wishful thinking’ by creating three dummy variables based on the 
respondent’s reported vote intention on the second ballot, namely SPD voters, 
CDU voters, and voters who are uncertain about how they will vote, with minor 
                                                 
7 While there could potentially be concerns regarding projection effects when using respondents’ 
evaluations of their discussion partners’ party preferences, previous research has demonstrated that 
voters are surprisingly accurate at identifying their discussion partners’ political preferences (Huckfeldt 
& Sprague, 1995). 
8 The proportion of right-leaning members is one minus the proportions of left-leaning members and 
members for whom the respondent does not know the political party preference.  Respondents with equal 
proportions of left- and right-leaning members in the network reach the highest value of one on the 
measure, indicating complete heterogeneity, while respondents with network members of only one 
ideological direction reach the lowest value of zero on this measure, indicating complete homogeneity. 
Respondents with ideologically mixed networks reach values between these two extremes. 
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party supporters being treated as the referent category.9  We also control for 
self-reported levels of political interest, attention to television news, and 
attention to news in newspapers. The sociodemographic measures that we 
include are gender, age (transformed into four quartiles), and education 
(transformed into three categories).  Finally, since the survey was conducted 
over a number of weeks, we account for the number of days before the election 
that the respondent was surveyed. 
Because we argue that social networks provide citizens with information 
that helps them to forecast correctly, it is instructive to examine how our network 
measures differ from other measures related to information, such as formal 
education, political interest, and media attention (TV and print).  We measure 
how network characteristics relate to these other informational measures by 
calculating Pearson’s correlation coefficient r (Table 3). While there is an 
association between network characteristics and political education, interest, 
and media attention, most of the time it is either very weak (|𝑟| < 0.20) or weak 
(0.20 ≤ |𝑟| < 0.40).  This means that while many people have personal 
characteristics (e.g., a low political interest) that might make accurate forecasts 
less likely, they nevertheless have social network characteristics (e.g., many 
discussants) that might make accurate forecasts more likely. In other words, for 
many citizens, their social network may potentially compensate for their lack of 
information from the media, while for others it may correct or complement the 
media information they receive. The weak correlation between network 
characteristics and political interest, education and media attention, together 
with our theoretical arguments, justify us in considering network characteristics 
as additional predictors of a citizen’s forecasting accuracy.  
 
Table 3: Correlation between network characteristics and education, 
political interest, and media attention. 
  
Education 
Political 
interest 
TV news 
attention 
Print news 
attention 
                                                 
9 Germany uses a mixed member proportional electoral system, which provides voters with the 
opportunity to cast both a candidate vote (first ballot) and a party vote (second ballot) for the Bundestag, 
with the party vote determining the overall share of seats in the legislature.  This latter measure of vote 
intention forms the most comparable measure between East and West Germany, as partisanship was not 
asked of East German respondents. 
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Network size   0.20  0.18  0.12  0.12 
Network frequency   0.33  0.46  0.43  0.31 
Network expertise   0.22  0.34  0.28  0.24 
Network left   0.01  0.09  0.03  0.04 
Network unknown  –0.05 –0.13 –0.11 –0.10 
Network heterogeneity  –0.01 –0.06 –0.06 –0.06 
 
The regression analyses reported below weight the respondents by inverse 
sampling probability in East and West, because East Germans were 
oversampled relative to their proportion of the population, and cluster the 
standard errors by sampling point. 
 
6. Results 
 
6.1. Correct and incorrect forecasts 
First, we examine the variables that predict the accuracy of Germans’ 
election forecasts. The outcome in the logit model shown in Table 4 is whether 
the respondent forecasted the CDU victory correctly or not.  In this analysis, 
incorrect forecasts include both responses that the SPD would win and “don’t 
know” answers.  While we are most interested in the differences in forecasting 
accuracy between respondents with different social network characteristics, 
looking at other variables that could predict the forecast accuracy enables us 
to compare these results to those of the handful of other studies that have 
looked at the characteristics of accurate forecasters.  
The results of the binary logit model in Table 4 indicate that social 
networks predict the forecast accuracy in ways that are consistent with our 
expectations, even when controlling for a host of other political, media, and 
demographic characteristics.10  We observe that both the number of people in 
the respondent’s network and the frequency of political discussion have positive 
and statistically significant coefficients.  This means that both having more 
people in the network and having more frequent discussions in the network 
                                                 
10 These computations and those that follow were performed on a Mac OS X 10.11.6 
with Stata/SE 12 using the logit, mlogit, margins, and lincom commands. 
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make a positive difference to the probability of a correct forecast.  Conversely, 
we observe that the shares of the network with left or unknown political leanings 
have negative and statistically significant coefficients.  This means that the 
larger the share of the network with left or unknown political leanings, the less 
likely the respondent’s forecast is to be correct.  The coefficients of both 
network expertise and network heterogeneity are in the expected positive 
direction, but miss conventional levels of statistical significance. 
 
Table 4: Correct forecast of CDU victory 
pooled binary logit estimates. 
Log-odds 
 Estimate (Std. error) 
Constant –0.89 (0.65) 
East –0.09 (0.19) 
Age 0.09 (0.06) 
Female –0.01 (0.13) 
Education 0.06 (0.13) 
Political interest 0.29** (0.09) 
TV news attention –0.03 (0.09) 
Print news attention 0.03 (0.07) 
SPD voter 0.03 (0.18) 
CDU voter 2.10** (0.27) 
Undecided voter 0.53** (0.25) 
Days until election –0.01 (0.01) 
Network size 0.22** (0.07) 
Network discussion 0.19* (0.11) 
Network expertise 0.24 (0.16) 
Network left –0.77** (0.24) 
Network unknown –0.59* (0.35) 
Network heterogeneity 0.15 (0.33) 
N 1547  
Note: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05. Standard errors are clustered by sampling points. The 
data are weighted by inverse sampling probabilities in East and West. 
 
19 
 
 
Of the other variables, only a few of the coefficients attain statistical 
significance. We corroborate the findings of earlier studies that respondents 
with higher levels of political interest are more likely to make accurate forecasts, 
and find evidence that CDU voters are more likely to forecast a CDU victory 
correctly than the excluded “minor party vote” category.  We also observe that 
respondents who say that they don’t know for whom they will vote (undecided 
voters) are also more likely to forecast correctly than minor party voters, though 
the coefficient is smaller than for CDU voters.  In contrast, SPD voters are just 
as likely to get it right or wrong as minor party voters.  
Notably, the coefficient of the “East” variable, which is designed to 
capture systemic differences between East and West Germans in this pooled 
analysis, is not statistically significant.  Furthermore, the demographic 
variables, media exposure, and number of days before the election are not 
predictive of the forecasting accuracy. 
We investigate the results of the full binary model and the subsequent 
multinomial logit models further by computing first differences (King, 1989, pp. 
107f). First differences estimate how much the fitted values would differ on 
average when comparing two respondents who have different levels of a given 
predictor while being identical on all other variables. We compute first 
differences by subtracting the expected probability of an outcome given the 
maximum value of a predictor from the expected probability given its minimum 
value, holding all other variables at their median. 
Figure 2 provides a visual assessment of the differences between the 
expected probabilities of a CDU forecast when comparing two respondents who 
have the minimum and maximum levels of a given predictor, while holding all 
of the other variables at their medians. The bold lines depict the 90% 
confidence intervals around the point estimates of the differences in expected 
probabilities, while the thinner and slightly longer lines show the 95% 
confidence range.  The predictive power of the social network variables is 
apparent here, reinforcing the importance of the network characteristics.  The 
network size and ideological leanings show large differences in the expected 
probability of forecast accuracy, differences that are rivaled only by political 
interest and respondent vote intention for the CDU or not known.  For instance, 
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if we compare a respondent who has five network members with someone who 
has only one network member (the maximum and minimum values for network 
size), we expect the respondent with the larger network to have a 15 
percentage point higher chance of making a correct forecast on average. As 
another example, if we compare a respondent whose network consists of only 
left-leaning members with someone whose network consists of no left-leaning 
members, we expect the one with the more left-leaning network to have a 16 
percentage point smaller chance of making a correct forecast on average. 
(Table A1 in the online appendix provides the differences in expected 
probabilities and their confidence intervals that correspond to this figure.) 
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Figure 2: Difference in expected probabilities for pooled binary logit 
model. 
Point estimates and confidence intervals 
 
Note: Difference in expected probabilities between two respondents with 
maximum and minimum values of the indicated predictor while holding 
the remaining predictors constant at their median value.  The predictors 
are sorted by increasing effect, for network characteristics and controls 
separately.  Bold segments indicate 90% confidence intervals and thin 
segments indicate 95% confidence intervals. 
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6.2. Correct and incorrect forecasts and the “don’t knows” 
 
Next, we recognize that not all “wrong” forecasts are the same.  A 
respondent could either provide an incorrect forecast of an SPD victory, or 
report not knowing who will win, and the covariates that predict these results 
are likely to be different. We assess this by estimating multinomial logit models 
where those who offer incorrect (SPD) or uncertain (don’t know) responses are 
assessed separately relative to those who forecasted correctly.  We estimate 
this both for the pooled survey and in the form of an interactive model where 
we assess whether differences exist between East and West Germans when it 
comes to the coefficients of the various predictors.   
Again, we explore the results of the multinomial logit model further by 
computing first differences.11  Figure 3 presents the differences in expected 
probabilities and the corresponding confidence intervals for each predictor and 
each forecast (CDU, SPD, don’t know), based on the estimates of the pooled 
multinomial logit model (full results are reported in Table A2 in the online 
appendix).  We observe that the social network variables differ in their predictive 
power across the three distinct forecasts.  In general, we observe that 
respondents whose networks displayed a higher share of left or unknown 
leanings or lower levels of expertise were more likely to provide an incorrect 
SPD forecast.  In contrast, respondents who had less frequent discussions with 
those in their network were more likely to give “don’t know” responses.  
Specifically, if we compare a respondent whose network has five members to 
someone whose network has one member, we expect that the respondent with 
the larger network will be 14 percentage points more likely to make a correct 
CDU forecast, 11 percentage points less likely to give a “don’t know” response, 
and 2 percentage points less likely to make an incorrect SPD forecast.  In other 
words, we expect that respondents with varying network sizes will differ in their 
chances of giving a CDU forecast or a “don’t know” response, but that they will 
be similar in their chances of giving a SPD forecast on average.  In summary, 
the larger the network, the more accurate and certain citizen forecasts are. 
                                                 
11 Online Appendix Table A2 reports the full results of our pooled and interactive multinomial logit 
models. 
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(Table A3 in the online appendix reports the differences in probabilities and the 
values of the 95% confidence intervals.)   
 
Figure 3: Difference in expected probabilities for the pooled multinomial 
logit model. 
Point estimates and confidence intervals 
 
Note: Difference in expected probabilities of a CDU, don’t know, or SPD 
forecast between two respondents with maximum and minimum values 
of the indicated predictor, while holding the other variables constant at 
their median value. Predictors are sorted by increasing effect on giving 
a CDU response, separately for network characteristics and controls.  
Bold segments indicate 90% confidence intervals and thin segments 
indicate 95% confidence intervals. 
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Figure 3 also shows large differences in expected probabilities for 
respondents who differ in their vote intentions and levels of political interest.  
Comparing two respondents with high and low levels of political interest, we 
expect that the one who is more interested in politics will have a 27 percentage 
points higher chance of correctly forecasting the CDU to win and a 27 
percentage points lower chance of a “don’t know” response, but will not differ 
in the probability of an incorrect SPD forecast on average.12 
 So far, the binary and multinomial logit models and the difference in 
expected probability figures have demonstrated that social network 
characteristics are highly predictive of the accuracy of an election forecast, and 
can help us to distinguish between incorrect forecasts and respondent 
uncertainty.  These network measures, in addition to political interest and vote 
intentions, by far outperform demographics and media variables.  The number 
of days before the election that the interview took place is not predictive of the 
type of prediction given by the respondent.  
 
6.3. Allowing the coefficients to vary between East and West Germans 
 
German reunification ended 40 years of political division between East 
and West Germany. It has been of general interest to describe the similarities 
and differences in public opinion and behavior between East and West 
Germans in order to understand the extent to which the country has developed 
a unified political culture (e.g., Gabriel, 1997; van Deth, Rattinger, & Roller, 
2000; Fuchs, Roller, & Wessels, 2002; Gabriel, Falter, & Rattinger, 2005; 
Falter, Gabriel, Rattinger, & Schoen, 2006). In our context, we expect East 
Germans to rely more on social network information than West Germans, given 
the challenges that new democracies are likely to face, such as weak partisan 
cues, low levels of partisan identification, and volatile voters (Baker, Ames & 
Renno, 2006). Hence, we now examine whether the coefficients of our 
predictors differ between the East and West. 
                                                 
12 While we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the first difference for political interest is the same 
for network size related to a CDU response (b = 0.13; Std. Err. = 0.09; z = 1.54) or a SPD response (b = 
0.04, Std. Err. = 0.03; z = 1.34), we can reject the null hypothesis for a “don't know” response (b = –
0.17; Std. Err. = 0.08; z = –1.98). 
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We examine possible heterogeneous coefficients between East and 
West by following the recommendations of Tsai and Gill (2013) on interactions 
in generalized linear models. We first add product terms between each of the 
predictors and the East dummy variable to the pooled multinomial logit 
regression equation (the last two columns of Table A2 display the estimates of 
this interacted multinomial logit model), then calculate first differences of the 
predictors, separately for East and West. Finally, we compare the first 
differences of a predictor between East and West to assess the statistical 
significance and magnitude of the interaction (Figure A1 and Table A4 in the 
online appendix show all of these first differences).  
By following this procedure, we found statistically significant interactions 
for only two network variables (the size of the network and the share of the 
network with left political leanings) on just one outcome (“don't know”).  In other 
words, of the 18 possible interactions – six network variables multiplied by three 
outcomes – 16 are statistically insignificant. Since we would expect one to be 
statistically significant by chance out of 20 such comparisons, we do not want 
to emphasize the differences that we found. Thus, the results of the interacted 
model suggest that there are no major differences in how network 
characteristics predict forecast accuracy between East and West Germans: 
social networks predict the forecast accuracy in the same way for both 
groups.13 
 
7. A simple network measure for improving accuracy of out-of-sample 
predictions 
 
The analysis above described which citizens were most likely to forecast 
the election correctly.  Next, we would like to provide guidance for people who 
want to use citizen forecasts to forecast future election outcomes.  As has been 
                                                 
13 We also considered possible interactions between the most important predictors (Gelman & Hill, 
2007, p. 69): network size, network discussion, and network left, as well as political interest and vote 
intention.  We tested whether the network variables interact with each other or with the other 
predictors, again following the procedure recommended by Tsai and Gill (2013).    (In the online 
appendix, Tables A5, A6 and A8 show the estimated regression models, while Tables A7 and A9 and 
Figures A2 to A6 show the first differences.)  We found one statistically significant interaction: the 
importance of the frequency of discussion decreases with higher levels of political interest for the 
outcomes CDU and don't know. 
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mentioned, aggregated citizen forecasts are most accurate when individual 
forecasters are weighted by their forecasting competence.  The analysis above 
improves the researcher's ability to identify which individuals to weight more 
heavily: because social network characteristics predict forecasting 
competence, future aggregated citizen forecasts can be made more accurate 
by using these network characteristics to calculate the individual weights. 
However, network batteries take a great deal of space on a 
questionnaire.  The survey that we used in our analysis included five questions 
identifying network members, as well as follow-up items for each member thus 
identified, measuring their political preference, expertise, frequency of 
discussion, etc.  Is including network batteries in new surveys worthwhile in 
terms of improving the election forecasting accuracy?  Below, we show that 
even a single, abbreviated measure of the network size – asking citizens how 
many people they discussed an important personal matter with – improves out-
of-sample predictions. 
We compared the out-of-sample predictive accuracies of all possible 
subsets of the predictors considered above, with three modifications.  First, as 
the response variable, we chose whether the citizen correctly forecasted the 
winner (0 = “no”; 1 = “yes”), excluding the response “don't know” because only 
actual forecasts can be weighted.  Second, we considered the network size (0 
= “no discussants” to 5 = “five discussants”) as the only network characteristic.  
We do this because the above descriptive analysis found the size to be 
correlated strongly with the forecasting accuracy, and because this predictor 
also applies to citizens without a discussant, while the other network 
characteristics apply only to citizens with at least one discussant.  (Excluding 
“don't knows” and including citizens without networks changes the number of 
observations to 1,592.)  Finally, we replaced the three vote intention predictors 
with a single dummy variable indicating whether a citizen forecasted the same 
party to win as the one they intended to vote for (0 = “no”; 1 = “yes”).  We do 
this because this predictor can be used without the researcher knowing in 
advance which party will win (Murr, 2015).  This leaves us with ten predictors: 
east, age, female, education, political interest, TV news attention, print news 
attention, forecast intention, days until election, and network size. 
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We used k-fold cross-validation (e.g., Ward, 2010, Murr, 2015) to 
compare the out-of-sample predictive accuracies of all 210 = 1,024 possible 
subsets of predictors.  Cross-validation splits the data randomly into k folds.  It 
first fits the models to the k – 1 folds and then tests them on the kth one, iterating 
these two steps from 1 to k to get a distribution of the predictive accuracy.  We 
set k = 10, which is the typical value in the literature, and repeated k-fold cross-
validation with ten different splits.  We measured the predictive accuracy based 
on the area under the receiver operator characteristic curve (AUROC), which 
is a common measure of accuracy in the forecasting literature for binary 
classification tasks (e.g., Ward, 2010, Murr, 2015).  An AUROC value of 50% 
indicates a random classifier and a value of 100% indicates an optimal 
classifier.  The AUROC can be interpreted as the probability that a randomly 
chosen correct citizen forecaster will be ranked as more likely to be correct than 
a randomly chosen incorrect citizen forecaster (Fawcett, 2006). 
Including the network size as a predictor improved the predictive 
accuracy (Table 5).  Overall, the model with the largest AUROC of 62.57% 
included only five of the nine predictors: age, TV news attention, forecast 
intention, days until election, and network size.  In contrast, the best model 
excluding the network size achieved an AUROC of 61.40% – 1.17 percentage 
points lower than the best model including the network size.  Averaging across 
all 1,024 models, the AUROC of models including the network size was 1.4 
percentage points higher than that of models excluding the network size.  In 
comparison, only forecast intention and age had larger increases, of 3.98 and 
3.22 percentage points, respectively.  Including some predictors even 
decreased the predictive accuracy on average.  For instance, the AUROC of 
models including print news attention was an average of 0.17 percentage points 
lower than that of models excluding print news attention.  This all demonstrates 
that it is worthwhile to include the network size as a measure on new surveys 
because it does a better job of predicting forecasting competence than many 
commonly available measures (e.g., print news attention).  As elections grow 
increasingly competitive and election results grow tighter, even minor 
improvements in forecasting measurements may be critical in increasing the 
forecast accuracy. 
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Table 5: Out-of-sample accuracy of all 1,024 possible subsets of 
variables for predicting correct forecasts (0 = “no”; 1 = “yes”) by 1,592 
citizens before the German Bundestag election in 1990 using binary 
logistic regression. 
 Predictors (0 = “excluded”; 1 = “included”)  
Ran
k 
Eas
t 
Ag
e 
Fem
. 
Educ
. 
Pol
. 
int. 
T
V  
Prin
t 
Forec
. 
intent. 
Day
s 
Net
. 
size 
AURO
C 
1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 62.57 
2 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 62.48 
3 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 62.36 
4 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 62.32 
5 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 62.28 
6 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 62.27 
7 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 62.21 
8 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 62.19 
9 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 62.18 
10 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 62.18 
…            
91 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 61.40 
…            
 
Note: Entries are sorted by decreasing average area under the receiver 
operator characteristic curve (AUROC) in 10-fold cross-validation across 
ten repetitions and by decreasing the number of predictors. Due to space 
constraints, only the ten best models are presented, along with the best 
model without the network size as a predictor. 
 
8. Conclusion 
 
 This study has examined how social networks predict the ability of 
citizens to forecast the election winner correctly when controlling for other 
variables such as political interest, gender, education, media attention, and vote 
intention.  Specifically, we have found that citizens who have larger social 
networks and engage in more frequent political discussions are better at 
forecasting the winner than people who do not share these network 
characteristics. Our analysis also shows that the political leanings of the 
network matter too. Those whose networks contained a higher proportion of 
left-wing party supporters were less likely to forecast (correctly) that the right-
wing CDU would win.  Furthermore, respondents who were unsure of their 
friends’ party preferences were less likely to provide correct forecasts.  
Essentially, voters with extensive, communicative, and varied groups of friends 
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– and, of course, neighbors, colleagues, family members, and peers – are best 
able to forecast the election winner accurately.   
Finding such robust results for social network characteristics might be a 
surprise in this particular election, given that public opinion polls at the time of 
the survey in autumn 1990 pointed to a decisive CDU victory. We view this 
particular election as a conservative test of our social networks theory. With the 
election all but a foregone conclusion, one might expect the predictive power of 
social networks for the respondents’ forecasts to be limited.  However, even in 
this context, networks demonstrably predicted citizens’ forecasts.  In more 
competitive elections, where there is a greater degree of uncertainty about the 
likely winner, social networks and their characteristics would probably play an 
even more important role in predicting voters’ election forecasts. 
In addition to examining the predictive power of social network 
characteristics for election forecasts, we have also considered how experience 
with democratic elections might predict citizens’ abilities to give an accurate 
forecast, based on whether a respondent resided in East or West Germany.  
Perhaps surprisingly, East Germans were more likely to forecast the victor 
correctly than West Germans.  Also, while we might have expected that having 
had less democratic experience would mean that networks were more 
important for East Germans than for West Germans in predicting their 
expectations – given the challenges faced by new democracies (e.g., weak 
partisan cues, low levels of partisan identification and volatile voters, as was 
discussed by Baker et al., 2006), our analysis indicates that no such differences 
exist.  
 The robustness of our findings in both East and West Germany suggests 
that the predictive power of social networks should be present in both new and 
established democracies. However, since the institutional and political contexts 
of the 1990 German election are the same for both regions, future research 
should examine whether social networks predict citizen forecasts similarly in 
countries with different party systems and electoral rules.    
Future research could study how the internet and the emergence of 
online social networks have influenced citizens’ forecasting abilities.  Some 
studies have shown that the internet has neither increased nor decreased 
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social capital, but instead supplemented it (e.g., Wellmann, Haase, Witte, & 
Hampton, 2001).  Hence, citizens still seem to bond (form closer connections 
with others) and bridge (form ties across social groups) to the same extent as 
before.  Other studies have shown a large overlap between offline and online 
social networks (e.g., Subrahmanyam, Reich, Waechter, & Espinoza, 2008), 
meaning that the networks elicited using electoral surveys are likely to be a 
subset of those captured in online social networks.  Online platforms are likely 
to increase citizens’ abilities to forecast because they provide a wider access 
to information without additional cost. They enable citizens to be updated about 
their networks’ electoral preferences without face-to-face discussions, and 
allow citizens to be informed about all of their network members, even those 
who are distant from the most influential people in their network.  
A final lesson of our analysis is that social network characteristics, and 
questions on citizen forecasting, are important elements in electoral surveys, 
and that their exclusion may inhibit our understanding of political learning and 
decision making. The size and composition of social networks are associated 
with citizens’ ability forecast elections correctly, and understanding how and 
why citizens estimate the winners of elections correctly will be critical as the 
demand for political forecasting continues.  In the absence of measures of 
social network characteristics, we cannot predict or utilize these forecasts fully.  
In addition, understanding citizen forecasting also reveals something important 
about how social networks predict political learning. The size and ideological 
make-up of networks compete with other factors in predicting whether citizens 
can make correct inferences about not just local, but also national, political 
trends.  In summary, just as social networks help us to understand citizen 
forecasting, citizen forecasting informs us about how social networks predict 
contextual learning and political knowledge.   
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QUESTION WORDING APPENDIX 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE 
FORECASTING:  
From the present point of view: who would you say will win the next general 
election: The CDU/CSU or a coalition government led by CDU/CSU, or the 
SDP or a coalition government led by the SDP? 
NETWORK VARIABLES 
NETWORK SIZE  
From time to time, most people discuss important personal matters with other 
people.  Looking back over the last six months, who are the people with whom 
you discussed an important personal matter? 
NETWORK FREQUENCY 
When you talk with these persons, how often do you discuss political 
questions?  Would you say almost always, sometimes, seldom, or never? 
NETWORK EXPERTISE 
How much do these persons, in your opinion, know about politics: much or 
very much, average, less much? Would you say: much/very much, average, 
or less much?  
NETWORK IDEOLOGY 
Which party do you think would these persons vote for in the general election 
of 2 December this year? 
INDIVIDUAL LEVEL 
VOTE CHOICE:  
Second Vote: Which party will you vote for with your second vote? 
POLITICAL INTEREST 
Generally Speaking: How much are you interested in politics? Would you say: 
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very much, much, so-so, somewhat, or not at all? 
TV NEWS ATTENTION 
How attentively do you follow [television] news reports on political events in 
Germany and other countries?  Would you say: very attentively, attentively, 
less attentively, or not attentively at all? 
PRINT NEWS ATTENTION 
Regardless of how often you read your daily newspaper: How attentively do 
you read the reports on the political events in Germany and other countries? 
Would you say: very attentively, attentively, less attentively, or not attentively 
at all? 
EDUCATION 
What education level do you have? 
AGE 
Please tell me what month and year you were born 
GENDER 
Sex of Respondent: Man or Woman. 
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